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 1 Introduction: Humanism and Science 
 In this chapter, I wish to shed some light on perspectivism through the lens 
of pragmatism, especially in relation to scientific knowledge. The initial 
plausibility of this exercise lies in the fact that perspectivism and prag-
matism share a deep humanist impulse, which is to regard science as a 
thoroughly human activity, even when it is aimed at the production of the 
most abstract and objective kind of knowledge. (Here I am using the terms 
“humanist” and “humanism” much more broadly than a strict reference 
to Renaissance humanism would dictate.) I will begin by outlining my 
interpretation of pragmatism in section 2; in fact, this is the first publica-
tion in which I attempt to lay out my view of pragmatism in any detail, 
so some details are necessary and this will constitute the longest part of 
the chapter. This will be followed, in section 3, by brief reflections on the 
relation between pragmatism as I understand it and perspectivism in its 
various guises. Afterwards, in section 4, I will explore one of the most 
important implications of pragmatism and perspectivism, namely the  his-
toricity of science and scientific knowledge. A methodological advocacy 
of “integrated history and philosophy of science” will naturally follow. 
 Humanism in relation to science is a commitment to understand and 
promote science as something that human agents do, not as a body of 
knowledge that comes from accessing information about nature that exists 
completely apart from ourselves and our investigations. Perhaps this humanism 
is not such a controversial stance (its roots go at least back to Immanuel 
Kant), but I think there is much value in considering its meaning and impli-
cations carefully. The most important thing about humanism as I see it 
is not a focus on the biological species  Homo sapiens . For enthusiasts of 
artificial intelligence, animal cognition, or extraterrestrial intelligence, if we 
find or create serious non-human intelligence worthy of an epistemology, 
we might even want to call such agents “human beings” too. 
 In the rest of this chapter I will not speak explicitly of humanism, because 
I want to avoid the possibility of being mistakenly seen as advocating 
“human chauvinism.” Also, what I want to express by “humanism” can be 
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adequately expressed by the designation of pragmatism, which I think 
is the best expression of humanism among existing philosophical tra-
ditions. The most fundamental point about pragmatism, as I take it, is 
that knowledge is created and used by intelligent beings who engage in 
actions in order to live better in the material and social world. 
 2 What Is Pragmatism? 
 2.1 Beyond Semantics: Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Practice 
 What is pragmatism, and what does it imply for the philosophy of sci-
ence? It seems that pragmatism has largely fallen off the standard phi-
losophy curriculum, so it may not be such a bad idea to start with a quick 
review of the standard meanings of pragmatism. Let us pick up from 
where today’s students and general public are likely to begin. Google 
defines pragmatism as “an approach that evaluates theories or beliefs in 
terms of the success of their practical application.” 1 In more and better 
detail,  Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986) defines prag-
matism as 
 an American movement in philosophy founded by C. S. Peirce and 
William James and marked by the doctrines that the meaning of con-
ceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings, that the function 
of thought is to guide action, and that truth is preeminently to be 
tested by the practical consequences of belief. 
 This is in fact quite a good definition. The first part of it is a version of 
Peirce’s “pragmatist maxim,” paraphrased by James here: 
 to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need 
only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object 
may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reac-
tions we must prepare. 
 ( James 1907 , 46–7) 2 
 The Peirce–James pragmatist maxim naturally led to the semantic inter-
pretation of pragmatism, which is perhaps the dominant one today. 
Christopher Hookway says, “the pragmatist maxim is a distinctive rule 
or method for becoming reflectively clear about the contents of concepts 
and hypotheses: we clarify a hypothesis by identifying its practical conse-
quences” ( 2016 , sec. 2). In this way, pragmatism shares much with oper-
ationalism, the homegrown philosophy of the Harvard physicist Percy 
Bridgman, and with the verificationism that was widely taken as a core 
doctrine of logical positivism. This focus on meanings continues in the 
current pragmatist works of Robert Brandom, Huw Price, and others. 
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 In a similar vein, James presented pragmatism as a “method for settling 
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable” ( 1907 , 45). 
Unless some “practical difference” would follow from one or the other 
side’s being correct, the dispute is idle.  Hookway (2016 , sec. 1) recalls “a 
memorable illustration of pragmatism in action” by James, which shows 
“how the pragmatist maxim enables us to defuse an apparently insolu-
ble (albeit ‘trivial’) dispute.” On a visit to the mountains, James’s friends 
engaged in a “ferocious metaphysical dispute” about a squirrel that was 
hanging on to one side of a tree trunk while a human observer was stand-
ing on the other side. James described the dispute as follows: 
 This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly 
round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves 
as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between 
himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The 
resultant metaphysical problem now is this:  Does the man go round 
the squirrel or not? 
 ( James 1907 , 43) 
 James proposed to solve the problem by pointing out that which answer 
is correct 
 depends on what you  practically mean by “going round” the squirrel. 
If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the 
south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obvi-
ously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive 
positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of 
him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and 
finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go 
round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, 
he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back 
turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any 
farther dispute. 
 ( James 1907 , 44) 
 In this manner, the “pragmatic method” promises to eliminate all apparently 
irresoluble metaphysical disputes, and rather more important ones, too. 
 Even though I completely endorse the semantic tradition of pragmatism, 
my own emphasis is different. My inclination follows Philip  Kitcher’s 
(2012 , xii–xiv) warning against the “domestication” of pragmatism. Focus-
ing on semantics is a very effective method of domestication, making 
pragmatism look like a rather innocuous and interesting variation on nor-
mal analytic philosophy. I want pragmatism to be a philosophy that helps 
us think better about how to do things, not just about what our words 
mean. Recall the second part of the dictionary definition of pragmatism: 
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“the function of thought is to guide action.” Hearing the story of James’s 
squirrel, one might wonder: “But isn’t this just a matter of defining one’s 
terms carefully? Does it really have anything to do with pragmatism?” 
My take on that question is that the disambiguation offered by James 
is tied closely to potential practical ends. If my objective is to make a 
fence to enclose the squirrel, then I have gone around the squirrel  in the 
relevant sense ; if the objective is to check whether the wound on his back 
has healed, then I have failed to go around the squirrel in the relevant 
sense. It is the pragmatic purpose that tells us which meaning of “going 
round” we  ought to mean. 
 2.2 Pragmatism as Empiricist Realism 
 One very important reason why people often do not like to go beyond 
the semantic dimension of pragmatism is the fear of what happens if we 
go further and adopt the pragmatist theory of truth. This issue needs to 
be tackled head-on. It is a core part of my interpretation of pragmatism 
that we should reject the common misperception and prejudice that prag-
matism just means taking whatever is convenient as true. The “pragmatic 
theory of truth” attributed to James is widely regarded as absurd, and 
this has contributed greatly to the disdain for pragmatism among tough-
minded philosophers. Here is probably the most notorious statement by 
James: “ ‘The true,’ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way 
of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our 
behaving . Expedient in almost any fashion” ( James 1907 , 222). I think 
James’s choice of the word “expedient” was unfortunate, as sounding too 
much like just “convenient” or “useful”—or perhaps the word had quite 
a different connotation back then; that is for James scholars to debate. At 
any rate, the statement actually continues as follows: 
 And expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what 
meets expediently all the experience in sight won’t necessarily meet 
all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, 
has ways of  boiling over , and making us correct our present formulas. 
 ( James 1907 , 222) 
 I want to argue that what this passage really shows is James the 
staunch empiricist, declaring that the source of truth is experience, and 
that it is futile to entertain any more grandiose notion of truth. This pro-
vides an important clue to my interpretation of pragmatism. My proposal 
is to understand pragmatism as a deep or thoroughgoing empiricism, 
which recognizes experience as the only ultimate source of learning and 
refuses to acknowledge any higher authority. Something does need to be 
said in justification of empiricism, but for now let me take it as a credo, 
as an article of faith; some sort of empiricism might be the inevitable 
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starting point of epistemology in our scientific age, as much as the pre-
sumption of God would have been the inevitable bedrock of any intel-
lectual discourse in Europe in an earlier age. 
 The spirit of empiricism has been summarized rather poetically by 
Clarence Irving  Lewis, in his review of John Dewey’s  1929 masterpiece, 
 The Quest for Certainty : 
 Man may not reach the goal of his quest for security by any flight 
to another world—neither to that other world of the religious mys-
tic, nor to that realm of transcendent ideas and eternal values which 
is its philosophical counterpart. Salvation is through work; through 
experimental effort, intelligently directed to an actual human future. 
 ( Lewis 1930 , 14) 
 This passage is especially nice because it brings together the two pragma-
tist philosophers that I have found most inspiring. 
 On such an empiricist conception of knowledge, how might we make 
sense of traditional epistemic and metaphysical notions such as truth and 
reality? Central to my thinking is the notion of  operational coherence , a 
harmonious fitting-together of actions that is conducive to a successful 
achievement of one’s aims. 3 To put it somewhat more precisely: an activity 
is operationally coherent if and only if there is a harmonious relationship 
among the operations that constitute the activity. The concrete realiza-
tion of a coherent activity is successful ceteris paribus; this serves as an 
indirect criterion for the judgment of coherence. Operational coherence 
pertains to an epistemic activity (or a system of practice), not to a set of 
propositions; it is measured against the aims of the activity (or system) 
in question. Coherence may be exhibited in something as simple as the 
correct coordination of bodily movements needed in lighting a match or 
walking up the stairs, or something as complex as the successful integra-
tion of a range of material technologies and various abstract theories in 
the operation of the Global Positioning System. It has social and emo-
tional aspects as well as material and intellectual ones. 
 Coherence is the chief characteristic underlying a successful epistemic 
activity. It is the vehicle through which the mind-independent world is 
brought to bear on our knowledge. Operational coherence carries within 
it the constraint by nature, and in fact it is the only way in which real-
ity can give input to our knowledge. Using this notion of coherence, I 
propose a new coherence theory of truth: a statement is true in a given 
circumstance if (belief in) it is needed in a coherent activity (or system of 
practice). 4 Truth understood in this way comes with a specific scope or 
domain attached to it in each case, which allows us to legitimize intuitive 
statements such as “Newtonian mechanics remains true in the domain of 
macroscopic objects moving at low velocities.” And because coherence is 
a matter of degree, so is truth—and I think that is also right. J. L. Austin 
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noted long ago ( 1979 , 117, 130–131) that “very true,” “true enough,” 
and such are perfectly sensible locutions. Catherine  Elgin (2017 ) has more 
recently shown the pragmatic power of “true enough” accounts. It is not 
necessary to conceive of truth itself as a binary yes-no property, 5 and 
insist on speaking in terms of approximate truth or partial truth when we 
wish to discuss degrees of truth. The notion of (empirical) truth I propose 
can ground a kind of realism that is not at all contrary to empiricism. 
 2.3 The Empirical Learning of Methods 
 One salient feature of the deep empiricism that I see in pragmatism is 
empiricism concerning methods, which received its full articulation in 
Dewey’s late work  Logic , which he strikingly subtitled  The Theory of 
Inquiry . According to  Dewey (1938 , 12), scientific methods and logical 
rules arise from successful habits of thinking. Content and method are 
learned through the same process of inquiry. Success is being “operative 
in a manner that tends in the long run, or in the continuity of inquiry, to 
yield results that are either confirmed in further inquiry or that are cor-
rected by use of the same procedures” (13). This is how method-learning 
happens: 
 through comparison-contrast, we ascertain  how and  why certain 
means and agencies have provided warrantably assertible conclu-
sions, while others have not and  cannot do so in the sense in which 
“cannot” expresses an intrinsic incompatibility between means used 
and consequences attained. 
 (104) 
 And “we know that some methods of inquiry are better than others in 
just the same way in which we know that some methods of surgery, farm-
ing, road-making, navigating or what-not are better than others” (104). 
 Dewey stressed the continuity of rules—of logic, everyday inquiry, and 
the scientific method (4–6). According to him, even logical rules, like any 
other rules, receive their justification through the success of inquiry. He 
considered that “all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) 
arise within the operation of inquiry, and are concerned with the control 
of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions” (4). 6 What he called 
the “fundamental thesis” of his book was that “logical forms accrue to 
subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry.” 7 So it 
was crucial to look at the history of logic, which he regarded as a pro-
gressive discipline. Dewey argued that we needed logic to suit the modern 
scientific way of thinking, and lamented that logicians of his day tended 
to retain the form of classical logic while abandoning the metaphysical 
and operational underpinnings of it. 8 In chapter 5 of  Logic , he undertook 
a contextual analysis of Aristotelian logic, arguing that it was a system 
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admirably suited for the science and philosophy of ancient Greece (per-
haps only Athens), but no longer suited to the mode of scientific and 
philosophical thinking, which had changed dramatically since then. As 
some key elements of Aristotelian thinking that had been abandoned, he 
identified essentialism, the emphasis on quality over quantity, static clas-
sification as the form of knowledge, and the heterogeneous and hierarchi-
cal structure of the universe. 
 2.4 The Empirical Validation of the A Priori 
 What I am calling the deep empiricism of the pragmatists even touched 
upon the nature of a priori knowledge, as already indicated by Dewey’s 
views on logic. On this point, the most eloquent exponent of pragma-
tism was Lewis who, according to L. W. Beck, once declared “I am a 
Kantian who disagrees with every sentence of the  Critique of Pure 
Reason ” (in  Schilpp 1968 , 273). The core of Lewis’s disagreement 
with Kant was that Lewis denied the existence of synthetic a priori 
judgments. He did think that there was an important a priori element 
to knowledge, but that it was always analytic: “ The a priori is not a 
material truth, delimiting or delineating the content of experience as 
such, but is definitive or analytic in its nature ” ( Lewis 1929 , 231). A 
priori propositions are inherent in “conceptual systems,” but these sys-
tems are constructed and chosen by us on “instrumental or pragmatic” 
grounds (x). Once we have chosen a conceptual system, within it the a 
priori elements are analytically true. 9 
 Lewis called his position “conceptual[istic] pragmatism” and acknowl-
edged his debt to James, Dewey, and especially Peirce, but signaled a 
distance from “orthodox” pragmatism (xi). However, I think Lewis’s take 
on the a priori deserves to be brought into the mainstream of pragma-
tism. It is the epitome of deep empiricism that even the adoption of the a 
priori is made on empirical grounds. Lewis explains: 
 While the  a priori is  dictated neither by what is presented in experi-
ence nor by any transcendent and eternal factor of human nature, 
it still  answers to criteria of the general type which may be termed 
pragmatic. The human animal with his needs and interests confronts 
an experience in which these must be satisfied, if at all. Both the 
general character of the experience and the nature of the animal will 
be reflected in the mode of behavior which marks this attempt to 
realize his ends. This will be true of the categories of his thinking as 
in other things. And here, as elsewhere, the result will be reached by 
a process in which attitudes tentatively assumed, disappointment in 
the ends to be realized, and consequent alteration of behavior will 
play their part. 
 (239, emphases added) 
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 This pragmatic nature of the a priori also makes it historical, as various 
neo-Kantian thinkers ranging from William Whewell to Michael Fried-
man have emphasized: “there will be no assurance that what is a priori 
will remain fixed and absolute throughout the history of the race or for 
the developing individual”; “if the a priori is something made by the 
mind, mind may also alter it”; “the determination of the a priori is in 
some sense like free choice and deliberate action” (233–234). In this con-
nection, Lewis pays some attention to the actual history of science: 
 New ranges of experience such as those due to the invention of the 
telescope and microscope have actually led to alteration of our cat-
egories in historic time. The same thing may happen through more 
penetrating or adequate analysis of old types of experience—witness 
Virchow’s redefinition of disease. What was previously regarded as 
real—e.g., disease entities—may come to be looked upon as unreal, 
and what was previously taken to be unreal—e.g., curved space—
may be admitted to reality. But when this happens  the truth remains 
unaltered and new truth and old truth do not contradict . Categories 
and concepts do not literally change; they are simply given up and 
replaced by new ones. 
 (268) 
 It is interesting to consider how Lewis’s view on the a priori extends to 
logic. Lewis (vii) himself said that his pragmatist epistemology in fact 
arose from his work in symbolic logic, which was highly respected. There 
 are different systems of logic, and anyone who wants to reason logically 
must start by adopting a particular system of logic. But the only plausible 
and non-arbitrary way of justifying the choice of a logical system would 
be on pragmatic grounds, because appealing to the rules of logic for this 
choice would clearly be question-begging. So it may actually turn out that 
the treatment of logic is the most convincing part of pragmatism! With 
Lewis’s contribution, and the current proliferation of non-classical logics 
and their successful application in the design of intelligent systems, I think 
we must admit that Dewey has been vindicated in his fundamental thesis: 
“Logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to 
controlled inquiry” (101). And then it was perhaps natural for Lewis to 
generalize such thoughts about logic to say that the justification of the 
choice of any conceptual system can only accrue from the experience of 
trying to apply the system in question to various areas of inquiry (x–xi). 
 2.5 The Active Nature of Knowledge 
 Having considered what pragmatism should mean, we can attempt 
an overview of the fundamental question of epistemology: what is the 
nature of knowledge? Pragmatism as I see it does not sit well with the 
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propositional conception of knowledge that forms the bedrock of episte-
mology in the analytic tradition. With its emphasis on method-learning 
and practices of inquiry, pragmatism needs a conception of knowledge 
understood as an ability, the ability to achieve certain aims. The propo-
sitional conception of knowledge was quite explicitly criticized by James 
and Lewis when they attacked the “copy theory” of knowledge. Accord-
ing to James: 
 The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other 
popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual expe-
rience. Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut 
your eyes and think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get just 
such a true picture or copy of its dial. But your idea of its “works” 
(unless you are a clockmaker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes 
muster, for it in no way clashes with reality. Even though it should 
shrink to the mere word “works,” that word still serves you truly; 
and when you speak of the “time-keeping function” of the clock, or 
of its spring’s “elasticity,” it is hard to see exactly what your ideas 
can copy. 
 ( 1907 , 199) 
 Lewis was more succinct: “Knowledge does not copy anything presented. 
It proceeds from something given toward something else. When it finds 
that something else, the perception is verified” ( 1929 , 162). 10 Here Lewis 
is echoing Dewey’s notion of inquiry, viewed thoroughly and explicitly 
as a process: “ inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent 
distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situ-
ation into a unified whole ” ( Dewey 1938 , 104–105). 11 Here it may be 
argued that Dewey was developing a notion from Peirce, who in “The 
Fixation of Belief” had set out a perspective on inquiry as a process in 
which we “struggle to free ourselves” from a state of doubt and “pass 
into the state of belief” ( 1877 , 5). Even though Peirce tended not to 
focus on the practices of inquiry, when he did comment on them he was 
clear about their processual dimension. And Cheryl Misak adds that the 
important thing Peirce regarded as wrong with the state of doubt is “that 
it leads to a paralysis of action” ( 2013 , 33). 
 “The knower is an actor,” declared James (quoted in  Putnam 1995 , 17). 
Dewey went on to develop this vision fully, complete with his own 
memorable slogan: “we live forward” ( Dewey 1917 , 12). Experience is 
active, full of expectations and reactions, contrary to the impoverished 
view of it in traditional empiricism as the recording of information. 
Experience, and knowledge too, is something taken by active agents. 
Inquiry is pervasive in life, an essential activity of an organism coping 
in its environment. 
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 A pragmatist philosophy of science should recognize clearly that scien-
tific inquiry is itself a kind of human experience. Learning from experi-
ence also requires learning about the nature of that experience of learning. 
Pragmatist philosophical attention needs to be turned to the process of 
knowledge-production itself in order to provide an elucidation of epis-
temic activities. What do we do in order to gain knowledge, to test it, to 
improve it, to use it? How best do we organize and support such epistemic 
acts that we engage in? If we conceive of pragmatism generally as a philo-
sophical commitment to engage with practices, then pragmatist epistemol-
ogy will concern itself with all practices relating to knowledge. I believe 
that this is something that pragmatists were seriously engaged in. 
 For my own thinking about scientific practice, I have devised notions of 
“epistemic activities” and “systems of practice” ( Chang 2014 ). What  kinds 
of things do scientists do when they do science? They engage in some very 
complex practices, which may be analyzed as composites of many different 
kinds of basic epistemic activities, such as describing, predicting, explain-
ing, hypothesizing, testing, observing, detecting, measuring, classifying, 
representing, modeling, simulating, synthesizing, analyzing, abstracting, 
and idealizing. Many of these categories may seem like simple types of 
mental acts, but when we ask how any of it is actually done in particular 
situations, we discover that a complex network of material, mental, and 
social activities are involved. As an illustration, take something that would 
seem very far removed from actions: the definition of a concept. Consider 
what one has to  do in order to define a scientific term: formulate formal 
conditions for its correct verbal and mathematical use; construct physical 
instruments and procedures for measurement, standard tests, and other 
manipulations; round people up on a committee to monitor the agreed 
uses of the concept and devise methods to give penalties to people who 
do not adhere to the agreed uses. In one stroke, we have brought into 
consideration all kinds of unexpected things, ranging from operationalism 
to the sociology of scientific institutions. “One meter” or “one kilogram” 
would not and could not mean what it means without a whole variety of 
epistemic actions coordinated by the International Bureau of Weights and 
Measures in Paris. Even semantics is a matter of doing, as Wittgenstein 
and Bridgman taught us long ago. 
 3 Pragmatism and Perspectivism 
 Having sketched my own interpretation of pragmatism, I now want to 
consider how it relates to perspectivism. As indicated at the start by refer-
ence to humanism, perspectivism has a great deal of affinity with prag-
matism as I see it. They are both rooted in taking science as an activity 
carried out by humans or other intelligent  agents , and scientific knowl-
edge as a product of such an activity. Any knowledge arising from a par-
ticular activity will bear a clear contextual or perspectival stamp of its 
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origins. The only real difference may be in emphasis, pragmatism being 
more explicit than perspectivism in its action-orientation. 
 But what exactly is perspectivism? I start by following the recent expo-
sition by Michela  Massimi (2018 ), in which she consciously builds on the 
earlier articulation by Ronald  Giere (2006 ). Overall, she defines perspec-
tivism (or perspectival realism) in the philosophy of science as “a family 
of positions that in different ways place emphasis  on our scientific knowl-
edge being situated .” There are two main ways of being situated: 
 (1) Our scientific knowledge is  historically situated , that is, it is the 
inevitable product of the historical period to which those sci-
entific representations, modeling practices, data gathering, and 
scientific theories belong. 
 And/Or 
 (2) Our scientific knowledge is  culturally situated , that is, it is the 
inevitable product of the prevailing cultural tradition in which 
those scientific representations, modeling practices, data gather-
ing, and scientific theories were formulated. 
 ( Massimi 2018 , 164) 
 As Massimi’s definition indicates, there is no consensus on the precise 
interpretation of perspectivism. And what I want to do, especially in the 
light of various considerations made above in my interpretation of prag-
matism, is to advocate a rather strong form of perspectivism—Kitcher’s 
warning against domestication should be applied to perspectivism as well 
as pragmatism. Massimi goes part of the way with me here in stating that 
“truth-conditions for scientific knowledge claims vary in interesting ways 
depending on the context in which they are uttered and used” (171). I 
could not agree more, but I do not think it goes far enough. It is not only 
the truth conditions for a knowledge claim that are perspectival but the 
knowledge claims themselves. Even if we just take the semantic version 
of pragmatism, the very meanings of any concepts or terms we use are 
only contextually fixed. So there cannot be any knowledge claim that is 
not perspectival. Now, I may agree with the common notion endorsed by 
Massimi that “there are perspective-independent worldly states of affairs 
that ultimately make our scientific knowledge claims true or false”; how-
ever, I remain with Kant in insisting that such states of affairs, as such, 
are not expressible. 12 So it is not only “ our ability to know these states 
of affairs” that “depends inevitably on the perspectival circumstances or 
context of use” (171), but—I further argue—the very possibility of artic-
ulating anything about the state of the world. All we can ever talk about 
are conceptualized objects, which are in the realm of Kantian phenomena 
rather than things-in-themselves. 
 It might be useful to lay out here the three separate layers of perspectiv-
ism that I see. This is my own perspective, as it were, on perspectivism. 
Pragmatism, Perspectivism, and Science 21
Each of the three layers is compatible with some version of pragmatism. 
However, my own reading of pragmatism tends to go with the third and 
deepest layer of perspectivism. 
 (1) The same content can be expressed in different ways—in different 
languages, or using different expressions, that are not incommensurable 
with each other. In such cases, it can be considered that the strict meaning 
of the different expressions is the same. However, there will typically be 
different connotations attached to the different expressions, and such dif-
ferences in connotation can also embody divergent expectations, and can 
prompt and facilitate divergent courses of action. For example, consider 
how classical mechanics can be expressed in the Newtonian, Lagrangian, 
and Hamiltonian formulations. Even though it can be shown that these 
formulations are formally equivalent to each other, there are very sig-
nificant practical consequences in problem-solving and further theorizing 
that follow from the choice. 
 (2) Different perspectives can make us highlight and focus on differ-
ent aspects of a given object, and can also blind us to other aspects. This 
sense of perspectivism is consonant with quite a literal reading of “per-
spective”: if we look at a three-dimensional object in the normal human 
way, we will only see a two-dimensional picture whose content depends 
on the direction from which we are looking. Or we can project very 
different-looking shadows of one and the same three-dimensional object 
in different directions. A similar image of “viewing objects or scenes from 
different places” is the device with which  Giere (2006 , 13) initially intro-
duces the idea of perspectivism in his book. Generalizing this thought 
in a metaphorical way to the role that conceptual frameworks play in 
our cognition, we say that we can learn about something in different 
perspectival ways, like the proverbial blind people feeling different parts 
of an elephant. On a large scale,  Giere (2006 , chap. 4) takes it that scien-
tific theories or models provide such perspectival representations of the 
world as maps based on different projection methods do with the earth. 
This level of perspectivism still allows the possibility that we can build 
a true picture of the object, by unifying enough well-placed perspectival 
pictures of it, as we can similarly construct a three-dimensional image of 
an organ in a CT scan based on various two-dimensional cross-sections 
taken with x-rays. This view is perfectly compatible with the standard 
sort of scientific realism. 
 (3) Going more deeply perspectival, one can argue that the relation 
between our knowledge and the world cannot be spelled out in a straight-
forward way as given in the two above interpretations of perspectivism. 
Projection is a metaphor, as is “perspective” itself. The very seductive 
and deeply misleading aspect of those metaphors is that we take it for 
granted that the three-dimensional objects we are perspectivally study-
ing exist “out there” in themselves, well-formed independently of all 
our cognition and action. When we are facing the universe, we do not 
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have the equivalent of the perfectly understood three-dimensional object 
that we try to represent from various two-dimensional perspectives. 
The strong pragmatism I have articulated argues against the cogency 
of such a notion of ready-made reality and affirms the strong ontologi-
cal perspectivism that Anjan Chakravartty warns us against: “there are 
no perspective-transcendent ontological facts or states of affairs” ( 2017 , 
177). People often imagine that the broadly accepted “scientific” pic-
ture of the world is the ready-made reality, rather than just one per-
spectival picture; this is to commit the error of “hypostatization,” as 
Dewey named it. 13 Any phenomenon of nature that we can think or 
talk about at all is couched in concepts, and we choose from different 
conceptual frameworks (as C. I. Lewis emphasized), which are liable to 
be incommensurable with each other. If we take “perspective” to mean a 
conceptual framework in this sense, then we can see that ontology itself 
is perspectival. Only unspeakable noumena may be imagined to exist in 
an absolute sense, guaranteed to be shared between incommensurable 
frameworks. 
 The kind of realism sanctioned by the last kind of perspectivism is 
strongly pluralist: each good perspective offers a true account that is 
worth preserving and developing, without the need or sometimes even 
the possibility to reduce or bind it to another perspective ( Chang 2018 ). 
The knowledge gained from each perspective answers to reality in its 
own way, but not in a way that is straightforwardly comparable to other 
ways. All this is not to deny that it may be possible to make productive 
links, sometimes even reductive or unificatory ones, between different 
perspectives; however, whether such links are possible is an empirical 
question—neither a foregone conclusion nor an inescapable imperative. 
The pluralism expressed here can resist the usual attack on perspectiv-
ism through the charge of relativism. A recent, well-reasoned instance of 
such an attack is Chakravartty’s book on “scientific ontology,” where he 
denounces the “Kant on wheels” type of ontology as incoherent ( 2017 , 
186). Yet Chakravartty actually seems to be a strong ontological pragma-
tist and pluralist: 
 We know only about those ontological packages that have proven 
sufficiently successful as posits in these particular contexts . . . noth-
ing in scientific practice precludes the existence of other packages and 
behaviors that are unknown to us and, indeed, the hubristic image of 
our own ontological powers that would be required to think other-
wise should arguably give one pause. 
 (196–197) 
 It is in my view immaterial whether or not he likes to use the label of 
“perspectivism” to characterize this view. 
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 To sum up: pragmatism, as I articulate it in this chapter, strengthens 
perspectivism. Not only is such pragmatism consonant with various ver-
sions of perspectivism (partly due to the humanist grounding that they 
both share), but it should give perspectivists the courage to see just how 
deeply perspectivism can and should go. 
 4 The Historicity of Science and the Need for Integrated HPS 
 If we take seriously the pragmatist or perspectivist view of knowledge and 
inquiry as articulated here, what follows about the nature of science? And 
what does that imply about how we should practice the history and phi-
losophy of science (HPS)? Here I return to the idea of pragmatism as deep 
empiricism. If the only learning we can do comes from experience, then 
learning about how to learn can only come from a study of the history of 
learning. If philosophy of science concerns itself with understanding and 
improving the methods of science, then it can only function properly by fol-
lowing the history of science. So, the epistemological side of philosophy of 
science is inseparably tied to history of science. This is an intuition that most 
practitioners of HPS already have, but I believe that the intuition should be 
grounded in a clearer and more explicit conception of knowledge. 
 It is an empirical fact that humans have learned that there are some 
valid patterns of inquiry that are quite common in various kinds of situ-
ations. As Dewey put it, “inquiry, in spite of the diverse subjects to which 
it applies . . . has a common structure or pattern . . . applied both in com-
mon sense and science” ( 1938 , 101). In Dewey’s view, there is a continu-
ity among various types of rules that govern everyday inquiry, scientific 
practice, and logical inference (4–6); scientific methods and logical rules 
arise from successful habits of thinking, and they receive their justifica-
tion through the success of inquiry (12). 
 Another observation to add to the basic historicity of learning is that 
truly empirical processes of learning need to be iterative. I had acquired a 
dim awareness of this from my work on the development of temperature 
measurement standards, through which I came up with the notion of 
“epistemic iteration” with a little bit of inspiration from Peirce ( Chang 
2004 , 44–48, 220–234). But Dewey had seen the iterative nature of learn-
ing in a very general light. The key question, according to Dewey, was 
“whether inquiry can develop in its own ongoing course the logical stan-
dards and forms to which  further inquiry shall submit.” And “one might 
reply by saying that it can because it has” ( Dewey 1938 , 5). Because there 
are no “standards  ab extra ” that inquiry can rely on, it must be possible 
to have a “self-corrective process of inquiry” if we are to get anywhere. 
Logical principles, at each stage of this process, are “operationally  a pri-
ori ” (14). This view is very consonant with that of Lewis about a priori 
principles in general. 
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 Now consider the nature of knowledge as well as inquiry. If knowledge 
is the product of inquiry, and inquiry is an iterative process as we have 
just described, then knowledge can only be understood fully by knowing 
the history of inquiry, because any stage of knowledge can only develop 
by relying on the previous stage, and its shape is ineliminably influenced 
by its starting point. It is not good enough to know the current conditions 
of science, because present science is not only a response to present needs, 
but it is in large part also determined by our inheritance, which arose 
from answering past needs. 
 Learning about the past conceptions and techniques that have shaped 
our present science is not just a matter of description. It is actually 
much more crucial for a normative project. In order to re-process our 
inheritance intelligently, we should first understand how it came into 
being. Benedetto Croce once said, “only historical judgment liberates 
the spirit from the pressure of the past” ( 1941 , 48). Learning the his-
tory of how scientists came to believe today’s orthodoxy can not only 
aid our understanding of the science, but it may also reveal that what 
we take as evident and necessary truths today were results of past deci-
sions that were contingent and could have gone in a different way. Such 
awareness of past contingency also allows the possibility of making that 
contingency real again in the present; thereby history of science can 
legitimately support normative philosophy of science too, quite con-
trary to common impressions of the fundamentally descriptive nature 
and mission of historiography. 
 In the converse direction of dependence, why the history of science 
needs the philosophy of science will perhaps be quite obvious to most 
perspectivist readers of this volume. No history can be written as a “view 
from nowhere.” And no history of science can be written in a philosophy-
of-science vacuum, if we take philosophy of science as a field that provides 
notions about the nature of scientific practice and scientific knowledge. 
The question is what kind of philosophy we should take as our historio-
graphical framing device. The old internalism, which was certainly ame-
nable to history–philosophy integration, achieved the integration only 
in a diminished fashion. It tended to talk of knowledge as theories and 
experiments existing in the service of theories. It was linked up with a 
truth-focused justificationist epistemology firmly based on the proposi-
tional conception of knowledge. This kind of history–philosophy integra-
tion was only made possible by impoverishing the history. Pragmatism 
and perspectivism offer superior alternatives. 
 Here I return to the broad humanist framing with which I began this 
chapter. If we appreciate the acquisition and development of knowledge 
fully in the context of human life, we need to examine the development of 
scientific knowledge that serves the purposes of life. Recall the humanist 
flourish of the Vienna Circle Manifesto: 
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 Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure of all things. 
Here is an affinity with the Sophists, not with the Platonists; with the 
Epicureans, not with the Pythagoreans; with all those who stand for 
earthly being and the here and now. 
 ( Neurath et al. 1973 , 306) 
 “ The scientific world-conception serves life, and life receives it ” (318). 
Such an outlook on science can best be framed not in terms of logical 
positivism as it is commonly understood, but in terms of pragmatism 
taken as deep empiricism. 
 There are many reasons to pursue integrated HPS, and many ways 
for doing it. 14 What has been lacking in my own advocacy of integrated 
HPS is a broad philosophical grounding for it, a general philosophical 
perspective from which integrated HPS is a crucial thing to be doing for 
those who concern themselves with the place of science in human life. 
The need for integrated HPS arises naturally if we take a humanist view 
of science. 
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 Notes 
 1 . This definition appears on simply searching for “pragmatism” in Google, and 
it is part of the Google Dictionary (www.google.be/search?q=Dictionary). 
 2 . For the original formulation, see  Peirce (1878 , 293). 
 3 . For some preliminary thoughts along this direction published so far, see  Chang 
(2016 ,  2017 ,  2018 ). In  Chang (2016 ), I used the phrase “pragmatic coherence.” 
 4 . A preliminary exposition of this account is in  Chang (2017 ). The epistemic 
activity in question does not have to be one of explicit testing. Sometimes a true 
statement is explicitly verified; other times its truth consists in its involvement 
in other kinds of successful activities. 
 5 . Many-valued logics are possible, and in fact seem to be flourishing. 
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 6. Dewey references Peirce in connection with this thought, in footnote 1 on 
page 9. 
 7 . That was the first of his “six theses” about logic ( Dewey 1938 , 14–21). 
 8 . Dewey argued that logical principles were only “operationally a priori” at 
each stage of the evolution of knowledge ( Dewey 1938 , 14). If that is the 
situation even with logic, need we say much about the revisability and evolv-
ability of the methods of science? 
 9 . The following statements are helpful in clarifying Lewis’s position: “The 
necessity of the a priori is its character as legislative act. It represents a con-
straint imposed by the mind, not a constraint imposed upon mind by some-
thing else” ( Lewis 1929 , 197). “The paradigm of the  a priori in general is 
the definition. It has always been clear that the simplest and most obvious 
case of truth which can be known in advance of experience is the explica-
tive proposition and those consequences of definition which can be derived 
by purely logical analysis. These are necessarily true, true under all possible 
circumstances, because definition is legislative” (239–240). 
 10 . See also  Lewis (1929 , 165). 
 11 . Dewey went on to dissect the inquiry process into several steps ( Dewey 1938 , 
105–112). 
 12 . There are, of course, intricate debates about how much Kant was willing 
to enter into metaphysical commitments reaching beyond the phenomenal 
realm. See, for example,  Massimi (2017 ) for discussion. 
 13 . See  Fesmire (2015 , 64–73) for a nice exposition. 
 14 . See  Arabatzis and Schickore (2012 ), and references therein, for a relatively 
recent assessment of the state of play in this area of work. 
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